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Stefan Collignon1 
 
Is Europe going far enough? 
Reflections on the EU’s Economic Governance 
 
Abstract 
 
Europe’s economic governance is not only highly complex, 
but also increasingly inefficient and therefore 
unsustainable in the long run. This conclusion is reached 
from the theory of collective action and the difficulties in 
democratic legitimacy. The solution would be the creation 
of a European government accountable to European 
citizens.  
 
The economic governance of the European Union, and especially of 
the Eurozone, has seen a rapid development since the Maastricht 
Treaty was signed in 1992 and European Monetary Union (EMU) 
started in 1999. Governance means the specific ways of deciding and 
implementing policies through informal rules and formal institutions 
and a set of agreed objectives. Different institutional arrangements 
and policy-orientations define different regimes of governance. In 
this paper I will look at whether the EU’s economic arrangements 
are consistent with its objectives. I will argue that some of them are, 
others are not and for their efficient governance a central 
government is required. 
 
The Treaty set the institutional framework for policy coordination 
through the triad of an independent European Central Bank (art. 
105), the Excessive Deficit Procedure (art. 104) and multilateral 
surveillance through the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines (BEPG) 
(art. 99). Subsequently a whole range of complementing processes, 
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methods and strategies have been introduced, starting with the 
Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) 1996/97, the European 
Employment Strategy (Luxemburg Process) 1997, the Cardiff 
Process 1998 for product and capital market reform, and the 
Macroeconomic Dialogue (Cologne Process) 1999. Some of these 
procedures, notably the SGP and the Macroeconomic Dialog focus 
more on stabilisation policies, the policy mix and demand 
management, others like the Luxemburg and Cardiff Process 
emphasise “structural reforms” and the supply side. The Lisbon 
Strategy in 2000 has also institutionalised the special Spring 
European Councils and developed the “Open Method of 
Coordination” (OMC), which was further fine-tuned at the European 
Councils in Stockholm (2001), Barcelona (2002) and Brussels 
(2003).  
 
The Lisbon European Council in 2000 designed a comprehensive 
and integrated strategy for all these separate processes by stipulating 
to make Europe “the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-
based economy in the world, capable of sustaining economic growth 
with more and better jobs and greater cohesion” (European Council, 
2000) The overall strategy was based on four policy areas: (1) 
Transition to a knowledge-based economy and society by fostering 
the information society, R&D and innovation, and stepping up 
structural reform. (2) Completing the single market, especially for 
financial services in order to facilitate higher investment. (3) 
Modernising the European social model by investing in people and 
combating social exclusion. (4) Sustaining favourable economic 
growth by an appropriate macroeconomic policy mix. 
 
Progress on realizing the Lisbon agenda has been slow. Not 
surprisingly, the efficiency of Europe’s complex governance has 
been questioned (Begg, Hodson, Maher, 2003; Calmfors and 
Corsetti, 2003; Gros and Hobza, 2001, Collignon, 2001) and concern 
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about the democratic legitimacy of existing policy procedures 
(“closeness to the EU’s citizens” in the language of the European 
Council’s Laeken Declaration, 2001) has motivated setting up the 
European Convention which has now produced the draft of a 
European Constitution.  
 
With the exception of the European Central Bank and possibly the 
Convention, all of the recent institutional innovations have 
strengthened intergovernmental policy coordination; no further 
policy conferrals to the European level have taken place, while new 
procedures like the Open Method of Coordination, have been 
extolled as “reorganising the modes of European construction” 
(Telò, 2002). This may reflect a general trend toward more 
intergovernmentalism. Yet, the optimality of this development could 
be questioned. While economic integration requires institutions 
endowed with the authority to enact Europe-wide policies, it is often 
argued that this need may be traded off against costs from imposing 
identical policies upon heterogeneous groups (Alesina and Wacziarg, 
1999; for a critique see Collignon 2003). Therefore subsidiarity is 
supposed to be welfare increasing.2 
 
We need to understand whether the newly developed methods of 
intergovernmental coordination are appropriate for the tasks they are 
meant to accomplish. While certainly not all European objectives 
need to be decided or implemented by a centralised authority, it is 
also clear that not all forms of intergovernmental policy coordination 
will have the same effectiveness. There is a role for both 
intergovernmentalism and the community method. We need to 
establish criteria which policy regimes are likely to produce best 
results.  
                                                 
2However, the increasingly prominent role of the European Council and the 
development of the Open Method of intergovernmental policy Coordination were 
less a conscious decision for welfare improvement, but rather the second-best 
option after the failure to adopt common targets and policies. See Rodrigues, 2003.   
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In this paper, I will look at the different coordination regimes, which 
are institutionalised in the Open Method of Coordination (OMC), the 
Broad Economic Policy Guidelines (BEPG) and the Stability and 
Growth Pact (SGP) and the rules underlying their implementation. I 
will first discuss the need for policy coordination, and then assess 
their success in implementation. In conclusion I will draw some 
lessons for the design of a European Constitution. 
 
I. The need for policy coordination 
 
Externalities: the rationale for policy coordination 
 
The institutional developments in economic policy-making reflect 
the recognition that “a proper functioning of EMU requires a well-
developed coordination framework” (European Commission, 
2002:3). This requirement is derived from the fact that although 
monetary policy is fully unified under the authority of the ECB, most 
other policy areas maintain separate national policy-making 
competences. Because policy preferences are defined in national 
constituencies, different governments have different preferences and 
objectives. But at the same time the growing interdependence 
between national economies within the same monetary framework 
has led to an increasing range of spillovers into other jurisdictions. 
Many policy variables such as common inflation, interest and 
exchange rates, but also the aggregate fiscal stance are now produced 
“jointly” (von Hagen and Mundschenk, 2002). What one member 
state does, increasingly affects all others and inconsistent policy 
objectives would lead to welfare lowering outcomes. The 
internalisation of these externalities creates the need for policy 
coordination.  
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Policy coordination is therefore necessary when there are 
autonomous and non-unified decision-makers - with possibly 
incompatible (disjunct) preferences and objectives  - and when their 
actions cause spillovers into each other’s jurisdictions. Hence, policy 
coordination is a necessary feature of intergovernmentalism. But 
besides the argument of interdependence calling for cooperation, we 
must also consider preference change over time as a crucial element 
in setting up efficient governance structures. If different actors 
converge to pursuing the same objectives, other forms of 
coordination are required than if preferences are disjunct and 
inflexible. Furthermore, if policy objectives need to be revalued in 
changed circumstances, discretionary forms of policy-making are 
more adequate, than if one needs to stick to a given policy rule over 
time. These considerations determine different regimes of policy 
coordination, as I will explain in the next section. 
 
Commonly, four arguments are made to explain the need for 
coordination and these potential benefits apply to both supply and 
demand side policies: (1) National actions or policies may spill over 
directly into neighbouring countries. For example, state aids may 
cause distortions in the single market and must therefore be 
controlled at the European level. (2) Indirect effects are particularly 
prevalent for European collective goods. Macroeconomic variables 
like inflation, interest or exchange rates concern all economic agents 
in Euroland and if independent national policy actions would cause 
the ECB to adjust monetary policy, the economic conditions in the 
whole area would be affected. (3) Coordination should prevent or 
reduce the likelihood of free-rider behaviour by member-states. (4) 
Some political economy theories argue that policy coordination may 
be useful in deflecting criticism of unpopular but necessary policy 
action at the national level (Drazen, 2000). 
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Objections to policy coordination have focused on three aspects 
mainly related to macroeconomic coordination and demand 
management: (1) The size of spillover effects and potential gains 
from cooperation may be small (Gros and Hobza, 2001; Curie et alt. 
1989). For example, the aggregate demand effect of government 
spending may be compensated by rising interest rates, at least if the 
economy is close to equilibrium. (2) Policy coordination may cause 
potential dangers to the independence of the European Central Bank 
(Alesina et al. 2001; Issing, 2002). (3) A more general objection is 
that the observed differences in national policy preferences require 
independent policies to accommodate different “tastes” (Alesina and 
Wacziarg, 1999). The first two objections are related to the efficient 
policy mix in Euroland, the third is about its optimality and is 
analytically distinct from efficiency considerations. I will return to 
preference heterogeneity below. Here I will only insist that an 
efficient policy mix is a necessary condition for the sustainability of 
macroeconomic stability, but different policy mixes may also set 
different incentives for economic growth and improvements at the 
supply-side of the economy. Therefore there are many potential 
spillovers between different policy domains and coordination 
between independent actors is one way of achieving consistency 
between their actions.  
 
However, if coordination fails to produce a coherent set of actions, 
delegation of decision-making to a central authority may be required. 
The European governance framework has tackled the issue of 
coordination from four different perspectives. 
 
(1) Efficient macroeconomic policy is to ensure that the economy 
achieves non-inflationary, stable growth and high employment 
(TEU, art. 2). This implies that policy is actually capable of 
delivering these collective goods. Although this claim is not 
undisputed, it now seems to command a reasonable consensus 
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among professional economists (Allsopp and Vines, 2000). In 
particular, there is agreement that inflation is ultimately always a 
monetary phenomenon and therefore the central bank needs to be 
independent to prevail against other actors when there are 
inflationary shocks. But this independence also requires that 
monetary policy-making is unambiguously centralised in the 
European System of Central Banks. The creation of the ECB was an 
indispensable condition for the consistent design of monetary policy. 
However, European central bank independence implies a rather 
unique coordination regime for monetary and fiscal policy. 
 
 (2) Even if the central bank is independent, non-cooperative games 
between monetary and fiscal authorities can lead to destabilising 
outcomes when the objectives between the two are not consistent 
(Sargent and Wallace, 1981). Therefore fiscal policy needs to be 
constrained. This was the economic rationale behind the Stability 
and Growth Pact. By stipulating precise rules for “avoiding 
excessive deficits”, the pact reduces the potentially destabilising 
power of fiscal authorities and frees the ECB to set interest rates 
compatible with macro economic equilibrium. Whether this always 
happens is another matter and subject to intensive debate, but this is 
how the system is supposed to work. Yet, one needs to emphasise 
that its logic is based on the interaction between the single monetary 
policy and the European aggregate fiscal stance. Under Europe’s 
present day economic governance, this aggregate is only indirectly 
defined by the SGP, which stipulates one budget rule applying to all 
- namely “close to balance or in surplus” over the medium term, so 
that the aggregate structural budget position is also in balance. 
 
(3) Even if all national budgets were in perfect balance, inflationary 
pressures could still emerge from nominal wage settlements 
exceeding labour productivity increases. Sustained unit labour cost 
increases above the ECB inflation target would provoke monetary 
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tightening with negative spillover effects via interest and exchange 
rates on economic growth in the short term, but through investment 
also on capacity and employment in the long run (Collignon, 1999; 
2002: chapter 8). The institutional tool for internalising these 
externalities was the creation of the Macroeconomic Dialogue at the 
Cologne European Council. Policy coordination under the Cologne 
Process has been fairly soft, i.e. non-constraining, partly because the 
ECB refused ex ante coordination as a matter of principle, partly 
because the nature of wage bargaining in Europe is so diversified 
that uniform procedures are neither applicable nor desirable. The 
Macroeconomic Dialogue primarily works through the improved 
flow of information that clarifies the macroeconomic environment 
for wage bargainers. 
 
(4) An efficient policy mix will keep aggregate supply and demand 
in balance. But it will also have an effect on the growth potential of 
the EU economy, although the impact may be limited. The 
transmission mechanism from stabilisation policy to long-term 
economic growth works essentially through investment in the stock 
of physical and human capital (Collignon, 2002). Higher growth 
therefore requires a macroeconomic policy mix that creates an 
incentive for investment, but this effect would be significantly 
amplified if structural reform policies created positive externalities 
in the form of higher productivity. In the context of the European 
policy framework, the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines (BEPG) 
are supposed to internalise these reciprocal externalities between 
macroeconomic management and structural reforms by formulating a 
coherent document that gives orientation to national policy-makers. 
The procedures for the coordination of supply-side reforms were 
already set by the Luxemburg and Cardiff Processes, but only the 
Lisbon Strategy set out the overall design for achieving these growth 
and welfare improvements, with the “Open Method of Coordination” 
(OMC) as its instrument. The OMC is now applied in very different 
Stefan Collignon Is Europe going far enough?   
 10
fields, where general guidelines or objectives at European level are 
being translated into national action programs (Rodrigues, 2003). 
 
Hence, the EU has both a need for and a wide range of instruments 
for policy coordination. But how are they used? 
 
Governance regimes as forms of coordination 
 
Welfare increasing policy coordination can be modelled as a game, 
where the payoff to the players is highest when they coordinate their 
strategy. The constitutional question is which mechanisms allow 
independent authorities to consistently Pareto-improve welfare over 
time. We know from game theory that choice consistency is more 
easily established in sequential and repetitive games than in games 
with simultaneous moves,3 but this advantage comes at the potential 
cost of dynamic inconsistency with related problems of credibility 
(Kydland and Prescott, 1977). As we will see, the coordination 
between monetary and fiscal authorities can easily be set up as a 
sequential game, but intergovernmental coordination, like the 
definition of the aggregate fiscal policy stance, can not. 
 
Successful policy coordination has two dimensions: the consistency 
of objectives between autonomous partners and the dynamics in the 
interactions over time. If different actors make their decisions 
simultaneously, they may create positive or negative spillovers or 
externalities for others, who may anticipate them and respond by 
taking these decisions into account. If their strategies are mutually 
consistent, a Nash equilibrium exists, although the outcome is not 
necessarily Pareto efficient. Policy coordination is then one way of 
improving the outcome for both. The related compliance problems 
can be dealt with by setting up specific incentive structures (positive 
rewards, negative sanctions and institutions as commitment devices) 
                                                 
3
 For a good introductory overview, see Varian, 2003. 
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or by convincing others of the “rightness” of a proposed action.4 In 
the first case preferences remain given and fixed, and feasible 
outcomes are the result of strategic bargaining and side-payments. In 
the second case, the policy preferences actually change due to public 
deliberation. The relative importance given to incentives and 
persuasion distinguishes hard from soft coordination regimes. The 
flexibility by which policy objectives can be changed determines the 
degree of discretion versus rule-governed policy actions. 
 
When decision-making is sequential, ex ante coordination is not 
necessary and can be replaced by implicit coordination. Actions are 
then coordinated between a leader and follower. A typical case is the 
interaction of fiscal and monetary policy in EMU. The ECB 
interprets its status of independence as incompatible with ex ante 
coordination. Indeed, if a previous commitment to coordinated 
policy action would constrain the ECB’s capacity to react in case of 
any inflationary shock, it may loose de facto independence and the 
credibility of its commitment to maintain price stability. But this 
does not necessarily prevent the central bank from setting interest 
rates at a level that is consistent with macroeconomic equilibrium. In 
contrast to the Sargent and Wallace (1981) framework of a ‘chicken 
game’, interactions between European fiscal and monetary policy 
should be modelled as a sequential game, where the ECB is the 
Stackelberg follower (Allsopp and Artis, 2003: 14). The sum of 
national budget positions first determines the aggregate fiscal stance 
in Euroland; while the ECB preserves the freedom to decide which 
monetary policy stance is compatible with it. The potential 
handicaps of this institutional set-up are limited by the ex ante 
constraint of the SGP on national budget positions and by the 
                                                 
4
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commitment of the ECB to a conservative attitude on fiscal policy.5 
The sequential model of fiscal and monetary policy coordination 
therefore reduces the inflationary dangers of “unpleasant monetary 
arithmetic” without jeopardizing the possibility of an efficient policy 
mix. Hence, monetary and fiscal policy in EMU is only indirectly 
and sequentially coordinated, i.e. ex post, and not simultaneously or 
ex ante.6 The ECB is apparently operating with such sequential 
model in mind:  
 
“…there are no convincing arguments in favour of attempts 
to co-ordinate macroeconomic policies ex ante in order to 
achieve an overall policy mix favourable to growth and 
employment. On the contrary, attempts that extend beyond 
the informal exchange of views and information give rise to 
the risk of confusing the specific roles, mandates and 
responsibilities of the policies in question. They thereby 
reduce the transparency of the overall economic policy 
framework for the general public, and tend to prevent the 
individual policy makers from being held accountable. (…) 
Obviously, if national governments and social partners take 
the single monetary policy’s credible commitment to 
maintain price stability as given, when deciding on their 
actions, this will lead to implicitly coordinated policy 
outcomes ex post, while at the same time limiting policy 
conflicts and overall economic uncertainty.” Issing (2002) 
 
Coordinating monetary and fiscal authorities is one thing, policy 
coordination between European governments is quite a different one. 
Here sequential or implicit coordination is not possible because the 
strategic interactions may resemble the prisoner’s dilemma. In this 
case policy coordination by contracting and punishment for 
defaulting would improve the policy outcome. For example, the 
aggregate fiscal stance is determined by all member states 
simultaneously. National governments retain responsibility for 
national budgetary and structural policies with high potential for 
                                                 
5
 This conservative line of insisting on the need for fiscal consolidation is 
frequently re-iterated in ECB publications, but also in the confidential discussions 
in the Eurogroup, as the author could witness in 1999. 
6
 The same argument can be made for the implicit “coordination” between 
monetary and wage policies. 
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spillovers, but they are exclusively accountable to their domestic 
constituencies. Hence, there is no European institution able to 
provide “implicit” leadership to others. But if fiscal rectitude is 
politically costly at home, although Pareto-optimal for the Union, a 
dominant strategy would be to behave with fiscal laxity. Hence the 
need to establish coordination rules in the form of the Stability and 
Growth Pact. This is probably the most prominent coordination 
problem in Europe today, but the argument also applies to a much 
wider range of policies.  
 
Traditionally, the European Union has used four methods to deal 
with the externalities caused by simultaneous decision-making of 
autonomous governments.  
(1) Voluntary coordination between member states. If governments 
can agree in advance on what they want, policies are ex ante 
coordinated through consensus. There is then no risk of default, 
because each individual government does exactly what they all want 
to be done collectively. Hence voluntary coordination requires at 
least preference coherence, if not preference convergence between 
different actors. Specific coordination processes serve to facilitate 
the emergence of a consistent policy consensus. The Macroeconomic 
Dialogue under the Cologne process and the Open Method of 
Coordination are forms of voluntary coordination where public 
deliberation, the exchange of information, and peer pressure through 
naming and shaming are to facilitate policy preference convergence. 
The subsequent voluntary commitment to common objectives would 
eliminate negative externalities and create welfare effects from 
policy coordination. However, this form of coordination only applies 
to discretionary policy making, as voluntary agreements are made 
case by case, issue by issue and each partner retains the full 
sovereignty to join or withdraw from the process. Begg, Hodson and 
Maher (2003) call this the “loose mode of coordination in the EU.” 
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(2) Binding rules are necessary when the short-term preferences of 
different actors are inconsistent with their long-term preferences. 
Simple voluntary adherence to coordinated policy action is not 
enough to ensure compliance over time, as the actors are 
autonomous and free to withdraw from the agreement in the future. 
By making a binding commitment to an agreed long-term goal, 
dynamic consistency between multiple policy plans can be 
established. However, this poses another problem: will different 
autonomous actors honour their commitment to the policy rule over 
time? If the preferences of different actors are disjunct and do not 
converge over time, non-compliance is highly likely and a regime of 
hard sanctions is required in order to deter deviating behaviour. The 
regime of sanctions changes the pay-off matrix and therefore the 
incentives for strategic behaviour. Hard policy sanctions provide 
pigouvian distorting incentives. The typical example is the Excessive 
Deficit Procedure, which has been further ‘hardened’ by the 
sanctions envisaged by the Stability and Growth Pact. Explicit 
Treaty provisions establish the coercive mechanisms as legally 
binding obligations. I will return to the question of legality below. 
 
(3) Between hard and loose modes of coordination stands the 
intermediary regime of soft rules. Begg, Hodson and Maher (2003) 
refer to this regime as the “guided” coordination of the BEPG and 
the Luxemburg Process. If the policy preferences between actors 
converge, they are more likely to act in a similar and consistent 
fashion given a specific set of circumstances. A policy rule is then 
necessary to prevent dynamic inconsistencies, but non-compliance 
by individual actors is less an issue and therefore requires only a 
“soft” sanction regime.7 Soft coercive mechanisms, such as “naming 
and shaming”, are not legally binding, although the exchange of 
information, collective learning and peer pressure do contribute to 
                                                 
7
 Of course, the problem of collective compliance to the rule and the temptation of 
dynamic inconsistencies for the coordinated policy still persist. 
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the convergence of preferences. Agreed policy documents, like the 
BEPG or the National Action Plans for Employment, formulate rules 
as guidelines or focal points for medium term policies, while the 
implementation of policies is revalued on an annual basis, allowing a 
certain degree of discretion in policy making. 
 
 (4) Finally, the community method of delegation, now called 
‘conferral’ in the new constitution draft, transfers policy-making 
competencies to a unified agent such as to the European Commission 
or the European Central Bank. In this case, policy decisions are no 
longer made by autonomous actors with responsibilities to different 
constituencies and a need for ex ante coordination. Instead the 
unified authority formulates and implements policies with respect to 
an enlarged constituency, internalising all externalities by legally 
obliging other actors or governments. Delegation is the appropriate 
policy regime when national policy preferences are disjunct and 
discretionary decisions need to be taken, for otherwise anarchy and 
conflict dominate and prevent welfare improvement. 
 
We can summarise these different policy regimes in Figure 1. The 
two dimensions are preference consistency between actors and time 
consistency between actions. Disjunct preferences require “hard” 
regimes of legally binding policy decisions in order to internalise the 
spillovers of externalities. If dynamic consistency can be achieved 
by formulating a general obligatory policy rule, then coordination of 
autonomous actors is possible, provided they stick to the rules. If, 
however, policy decisions need to be revalued frequently and actors 
have disjunct preferences, they may be better off in delegating 
policy-making to a centralised authority acting as the agent of a 
larger constituency. Both regimes pose questions of democratic 
legitimacy, discussed below. On the other hand, if heterogeneous 
preferences converge to a generally accepted policy consensus, due 
to public deliberation, mutual persuasion and learning, then the 
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simple exchange of information and less constraining forms of 
policy coordination may be sufficient to improve welfare. Voluntary 
cooperation would be appropriate for specific discretionary issues, 
while a soft and flexible framework of policy rules would allow the 
integration of voluntary cooperation into dynamically consistent 
policy programs.   
 
Figure 1. Policy Coordination Regimes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The evolution of these governance regimes seems to follow a trial-
and-error path. When neo-functionalist federalists encountered 
resistance, they moved to softer forms of coordination, which opened 
the way for hard coordination again. I will now ask whether we can 
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The classical definition of public goods is that (1) once produced 
they are available in the same amount to all the affected consumers 
(jointness of supply) and (2) that everyone must consume the same 
amount of the good, i.e. the supply of the good cannot be restricted 
to those who produced it (non-rivalness for consumption). However, 
as Figure 2 shows, the concept of collective goods is larger. If only 
condition (1) holds but not (2), the collective good is called a club 
good; in the opposite case it is a common property resource. 
 
Collective goods, characterised by different externalities, require 
different forms of governance. However, the link is not a simple 
transposition from figure 2 to figure 1. The crucial distinction lies in 
the nature of expectations formed by autonomous actors regarding 
their pay-offs and the implications for interactive equilibria. 
  
Figure 2. Typology of Collective Goods 
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members are complementary to each other. The recent literature on 
network externalities has also observed the positive correlation 
between benefits and the number of group members. As Katz and 
Shapiro (1985) formulate: “There are many products for which the 
utility that a user derives from consumption of the good increases 
with the number of other agents consuming the good.” They defined 
the concept of network externality as: “[T]he utility that a given user 
derives from a good depends upon the number of other users who are 
in the same network”.  
 
The interactions between agents determine the level of payoffs and 
can therefore be related to collective goods. Cooper and John (1988) 
have provided a general framework that goes one step further to the 
level of actors’ strategies.8 They show that strategic 
complementarities arise if an increase in one player’s strategy 
increases the optimal strategy of the other players. This can lead to 
multiple symmetric Nash equilibria, where mutual gains from a 
possible change in strategy may not be realised, because no 
individual player has an incentive to deviate from the initial 
equilibrium. Thus, strategic complementarities would prevent an 
optimal allocation of inclusive collective goods, unless a mechanism 
is in place to ensure that coordination failure is overcome. It can be 
shown that inefficiencies due to strategic complementarities can be 
Pareto-improved by ensuring that all agents have equal access to 
information allowing them to deviate from an initially sub-optimal 
equilibrium and reap the full benefits offered by network 
externalities (see Benassi et al. 1994). 
 
These models are useful for our understanding of policy 
coordination. In fact, the positive spillover of a given common 
policy on any individual jurisdiction would only take place, if all 
                                                 
8
 Technically, spillover models look at the first derivative of a collective utility 
function, strategic cooperation failure models focus on the second cross derivative. 
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individual governments were convinced that their marginal 
contribution to the common policy has a positive effect on their own 
constituency,9 otherwise they will abstain. In this case collective 
preferences between autonomous actors will converge, and this is 
exactly what the soft policy coordination regimes in box III and IV 
of Figure 1 are supposed to achieve: increased flow of information, 
exchange of best practices, peer pressure are all mechanisms to “tip” 
a policy network away from an initial sub-optimal equilibrium and 
moving it to a higher Pareto-dominated equilibrium.10 This logic has 
two implications: (1) Due to strategic complementarities, voluntary 
policy coordination and adherence to guiding rules will be 
forthcoming if, and only if, a soft institutional structure ensures the 
“tipping” of the preference convergence. (2) The group of decision-
makers can be large, as network externalities increase strategic 
complementarities. Hence voluntary and soft policy coordination is 
the appropriate regime for the provision of inclusive collective 
goods. Enlarging the EU may increase the overall utility of European 
integration for all members. 
 
However, the case is different for exclusive collective goods, i.e. 
common resource goods (box III in Figure 2). Policy coordination 
for exclusive collective goods is hampered by strategic 
substitutabilities, which can be caused by two different forms of 
externalities. (1) Although consumption of inclusive collective goods 
is the same for all group members, their access (supply) is rival, 
meaning that the share of benefits for each group member falls as the 
number of participants increases.11 As a consequence, the feedback 
to the expectations of existing group members is negative. This 
creates strategic substitutabilities i.e. the second cross derivative of 
the utility function is negative. The individual marginal benefit for a 
new or deviating member of the group is positive, but for existing or 
                                                 
9
 For the formal deduction of this argument refer to Cooper and John, 1988. 
10
 On “tipping” see Katz and Shapiro, 1994 
11
 For a formal deduction of this statement see Collignon, 2003, annexe 2. 
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conforming members it is negative. Thus, there exists an incentive to 
go against the collective interest (such as the SGP) insofar as 
existing members’ willingness to pay for collective goods will be 
reduced as the number of group members increases. Large groups 
will therefore become “latent” in Olson’s (1971) terminology, i.e. 
the likelihood of a large group providing an exclusive collective 
good voluntarily will diminish. Thus, EU-enlargement is likely to 
destroy the benefits from European integration for exclusive 
collective goods, if left to voluntary policy coordination between 
member states. (2) Because benefits are the same for all group 
members, but access is rival, it is possible to externalise production 
costs to others and free-ride. For example, uncoordinated borrowing 
in the financial markets by any public authority could cause 
externalities with respect to interest and exchange rates or inflation 
that would affect all other authorities within the same currency area. 
However, the free-rider benefits from low interest rates are 
“produced” by other member-states’ collective fiscal restraint and 
this creates a generalized incentive for non-compliance with the 
policy rule. Therefore hard forms of policy coordination or even, as 
in the case of monetary policy, delegation to a European authority 
are required in order to provide these collective goods efficiently. 
The argument applies with force to the determination of aggregate 
fiscal policy as an instrument of stabilisation, because implicit 
coordination is impossible, but also to a range of other policy 
coordination issues, including a common foreign and security policy.  
 
The two points can interact. The zero-sum game quality attached to 
common resource goods provides an incentive to keep the group of 
collective decision-makers small, for otherwise one risks the non-
provision of the collective good.12 But if the group is enlarged, the 
provision of collective goods will be reduced and ultimately cease. 
                                                 
12
 Olson 1971:28 argued that large groups have a tendency to provide themselves 
with no collective goods at all, whereas small groups tended towards a sub-optimal 
provision of collective goods. 
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Hence, intergovernmental voluntary policy coordination will not be 
sufficient to provide large groups of countries with an efficient or 
even optimal amount of collective goods.13 A consistent approach to 
policy coordination for such goods requires “hard” regimes of 
governance. Thus, the boxes I and II in Figure 1 are governance 
regimes necessary for the provision of exclusive collective goods. 
However, it is also clear that the regime described in box II, where 
governments keep their autonomy, will become increasingly less 
effective as the European Union enlarges to new members. Strategic 
substitutabilities will undermine adherence to and compliance with 
the rules however “hard” they may be. This is the “collective action 
problem” of European integration. It implies that governments 
cannot be the ultimate source of European political legitimacy. 
Because the problem becomes more acute after enlargement, a 
profound rethink of Europe’s economic governance in a Union of 25 
or more member-states is unavoidable unless half a century of 
integration is to be undone. 
 
II. Policy Coordination and Legitimacy 
 
How well is the EU’s economic governance working? Its efficiency 
is not independent of the consistency of policy preferences and 
choices. If these do not fit together and contradict each other, policy 
outcomes will be suboptimal. We would expect that soft 
coordination regimes may be enough to supply inclusive collective 
goods efficiently, because these goods provide incentives for 
consistency. With exclusive goods this is not necessarily the case. I 
will now argue that even hard coordination regimes are no guarantee 
for their optimal provision. More integration by conferral is then the 
efficient response, but this poses problems of legitimacy. 
                                                 
13
 In Collignon 2003:113, I have discussed the welfare-enhancing role of the 
Franco-German axis for European integration in this context. 
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Legitimacy indicates that policy choices have been made in 
accordance with the society’s generally accepted procedures and 
values. It means that legitimate decisions do not violate the society’s 
core system of values and they are consistent with the underlying set 
of beliefs, attitudes and expectations. When policies are considered 
legitimate, they can be efficient in terms of allocating scarce 
resources to the realisation of their aims. The policy output may then 
reinforce their legitimacy  (‘output legitimacy’). However, the 
inverse is not always true: policies can be efficient and lack 
legitimacy when policy objectives are inconsistent with underlying 
sets of beliefs. As a consequence, the efficiency of policy decisions 
is not sufficient to legitimise them. In a non-dictatorial society lack 
of legitimacy may lead to suboptimal policy equilibria as decision 
makers will not find the necessary support to carry their policies 
through. 
 
Figure 1 showed inconsistencies, which can arise over time or across 
policy constituencies. Hard coordination rules aim to eliminate time-
inconsistency, whereby policy-makers may be tempted to exploit 
opportunities that arise from breaking previously made 
commitments. Related to this, but much less discussed are issues of 
legitimacy arising from collective preference change. This is a 
problem of reverse time inconsistency, when established rules 
prevent making new agreements in accordance with changed beliefs 
and expectations.  Hence legitimacy may suffer from an established 
rule, if the set of underlying values has changed with respect to the 
general consensus at the time when the rule was agreed. Secondly, 
policy inconsistencies may arise from ‘fractured’ or insufficiently 
integrated constituencies. Contradictory value sets prevent then the 
formulation of generally accepted collective choices.14 By protecting 
                                                 
14
 To prevent misunderstandings: I am not claiming that collective decisions must 
be taken unanimously or that disagreement about choices does not exist. But in 
democratic societies there is acceptance of  public choices due to the shared 
commitment to democratic, liberal and procedural values. 
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and encouraging the free communication between citizens and by 
open competition for policy ideas and party programs, democracies 
contribute to a reasonably rapid convergence of underlying beliefs 
about collective preferences, values and choices (see Collignon 2003 
for a formal model). The problem with European policy making is 
that by confining policy deliberation to national public spheres, the 
underlying sets of beliefs remain persistently inconsistent. The 
resulting crisis of legitimacy contributes to inefficient policy choices. 
 
 
The efficiency of EU governance 
 
In recent years, policy processes have focussed on providing 
inclusive collective goods by intergovernmental forms of 
coordination. This is particularly evident for a wide range of 
objectives defined by the Lisbon Strategy that display quasi-network 
externalities. Examples are policies for the Information Society, such 
as the deregulation of telecommunications, cyber space, digital TV, 
or creating a single sky, where a lapse of number of participating 
users increases utility.  These network goods also have spillover 
effects on other sectors like human resources, agreeing on a 
Community patent or integrating a Europe-wide financial market 
(European Council, 2003). By following the benchmarks set out by 
the coordination process, member states increase their competitive 
advantages. Hence, there are strategic complementarities between 
their actions and it is not surprising that European integration has 
progressed in these policy areas in recent years, as Rodrigues (2003) 
shows.  
 
However, these successes apply mainly to inclusive public goods 
with network externalities. For inclusive goods outside networks, 
progress is much slower. For example, the liberalisation of energy 
markets, implementing the Lamfalussy report on capital market 
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integration, or research policies aimed at increasing R&D in the 
private sector have been tedious, to say the least. It could be argued 
that the monopolistic provision of national utilities, like electricity, is 
better classified as an exclusive collective good (a common property 
resource) than as a network externality. Little progress has been 
achieved on social cohesion, pension reform or a European 
framework for social protection that would facilitate cross-border 
labour mobility. In most of these cases we witness hardly any 
convergence of national policy preferences. National governments 
protect particular interests relevant to their national constituencies 
and this prevents not only convergence, but often even the 
implementation of previous agreements.15  
 
While soft coordination seems to work on balance for inclusive 
goods, the policy regime of hard coordination is facing serious 
difficulties, not only with efficiency, but also with legitimacy. There 
is now a wide range of public policies in the EU creating exclusive 
collective goods, which require harder forms of coordination.16 The 
most prominent example is the Stability and Growth Pact. The 
creation of European Monetary Union has significantly extended the 
range of these goods. I will therefore focus on macroeconomic 
stabilisation policies as the paradigmatic case. 
  
Consistency and legitimacy 
  
As the theory of fiscal federalism has shown (Oates, 1972), 
macroeconomic stabilisation policy is an important subset of 
exclusive collective goods. The experience with the Stability and 
Growth Pact has also revealed that stabilisation policies are 
dominated by strategic substitutabilities in the context of 
                                                 
15
 The Commission has more than 1,500 legal actions pending against member 
states for breaches of EU legislation (Financial Times, 23.04.03). 
16
 For a tentative list of policy assignments to the inclusive/exclusive distinction, 
see Collignon 2003. 
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discretionary policies. This fact reflects well-known problems of 
dynamic consistency inherent in fiscal policy. By setting hard 
coordination rules for fiscal policy with the common objective to 
balance structural deficits in every member state, the SGP addresses 
this problem. However, there are two difficulties.  
 
First, are we really sure that fiscal policy should be rule-based and 
not discretionary? At least from a Keynesian point of view, fiscal 
policy must be ‘flexible’ to counter insufficient demand in the 
business cycle and some argue that hard coordination rules inhibit 
this. Yet, it is not clear that the SGP prevents fiscal flexibility. The 
Commission has frequently argued that with balanced structural 
budgets, there is plenty of room for cyclical deficit variations. 
Furthermore, automatic stabilizers did work in the recent slowdown, 
although they were not the principal cause for breaking the 3 percent 
deficit targets. Instead, there was a clear lack of commitment to 
balance structural deficits in several countries in the early boom 
times of the EMU. Pro-cyclical tax cuts reinforced the difficulties of 
keeping to the deficit limit. The ‘sinning countries’, Portugal, 
Germany, and France are those who made the least adjustments in 
good years and are now calling for more discretion in fiscal policy. 
However, the whole point of the Pact was to prevent this kind of 
discretion. The theory of collective action tells us that if one were to 
increase ‘flexibility’ in national budget positions, the most likely 
outcome would be more volatile monetary policy with less, rather 
than more macroeconomic stability. For more discretion in national 
budgets would create an uncoordinated aggregate stance. The ECB, 
acting as a Stackelberg-follower would have to adjust interest rates 
more often and this creates instability in financial markets with 
negative consequences for output. Hence, what is needed is 
flexibility in the coordinated aggregate rather than the national 
budget position. The question then arises how rule-based 
coordination between autonomous fiscal authorities can provide 
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policy discretion at the European level. Because stabilisation policy 
is an exclusive good, collective action problems are likely to prevent 
this outcome. Therefore, the determination of the aggregate fiscal 
stance should be delegated to the European level. But this raises the 
issue of the democratic legitimacy of policy decisions in 
heterogeneous constituencies. 
 
Most analytic models assume policy preferences as ex ante given 
and derive government actions from utility maximizing behaviour. It 
does not matter for our discussion whether this utility is national 
welfare or narrow interest by politicians. The point is that given the 
autonomy of national budget policies and the preponderate role of 
national Parliaments, national policy preferences are disjunct and 
exogenous to the European level. Under multilevel governance, 
governments then bargain for solutions, which make the distribution 
of costs and benefits acceptable for them or for the specific 
constituency they represent. At the EU-level, heterogeneous policy 
preferences are made consistent. However, neither the outcome of 
the bargain, nor the bargaining process itself, is supposed to change 
ex ante preferences within the national framework. Therefore the 
underlying preferences remain inconsistent. The bargained solution 
is ‘sold’ as the best possible result given the constraints, or as a 
‘minimised loss’. But for ordinary citizens, a loss is a loss, whether 
minimized or not. Because there is no political competition at the 
European level for alternative policy solutions, none is accountable 
for the optimality of European policy decisions, and governments do 
not have to convince voters that a policy decision is optimal with 
respect to the provision of European collective goods.17 Thus, the 
EU does not have mechanisms to facilitate European-wide 
preference change and the emergence of a consistent system of 
values and underlying beliefs – a process that usually takes place 
                                                 
17
 In fact, it is exactly this logic that allows abuse of “Europe” for the “politics of 
blame”. 
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within member states through the collective deliberation of 
parliaments, citizens and voters. As a consequence, European 
policies suffer from a “democratic deficit” in the sense that citizens 
feel disenfranchised from policy decisions negotiated between 
governments and their burocracies. 
 
The coordination problem is reinforced by democratic preference 
change within national constituencies that I have called ‘reverse 
time-inconsistency’.  For example in recent years, a significant shift 
from left to right wing governments has taken place in Europe, 
reflecting the obvious fact that policy preferences within different 
constituencies are not cast in stone. Some of the recently elected 
governments have expressed fiscal policy preferences different from 
what the Stability Growth Pact demands, and therefore, they see the 
SGP as an obstacle to the policies for which they have been 
elected18. Yet, the purpose of the Pact was exactly this: to prevent 
discretionary changes in fiscal policy (see Figure 1). But then the 
question arises: why have elections in the first place, if nothing can 
be changed? We are touching here the core of democracy. 
  
The fatal flaw:  Lack of democracy 
 
All theories of democracy presume that people who live together in a 
society need a process for arriving at binding decisions that take 
everybody’s interests into account. One common justification for 
democracy allies the premises that people are generally the best 
judge of their own interests with the argument that equal citizenship 
rights are necessary to protect those interests (Gutmann, 1993). The 
first premise refers to citizens’ equal distribution in collective 
judgement and emphasizes communication. The second relates to the 
equal contribution of the power to make collective decisions 
(Warren, 2001). However, the frame of reference is the range of 
                                                 
18
 Coeure and Pisani-Ferry, 2003, discuss some reform proposals. 
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collective goods, as that is what affects citizens’ interests. Different 
public goods may affect different groups of citizens, as shown by the 
theory of fiscal federalism. I am here concerned with collective 
European goods i.e. policy outcomes which affect all citizens of the 
European Union or at least Euroland. The democratic deficit will 
then arise at the European level if either citizens are not participating 
equally in the deliberation of European policies, or if their power to 
make decisions is unequally distributed. Both are the case in the EU. 
In fact, communication and deliberation on European policies is 
primarily concentrated in national constituencies and on national 
political competition, because this is the only institutional vehicle 
through which citizens can participate in policy making. But the 
consequence of this fact is that political preferences for European 
collective goods converge to disjunct national preferences rather 
than to European preferences. Furthermore, the distribution of power 
to make decisions is truly asymmetric, as the ultimate power is with 
the Council over which European citizens have no equal rights. This 
is not only an argument about voting rights,19 but also about the 
impossibility to remove European decision-makers collectively. 
 
National governments are accountable to their national 
constituencies. If these constituencies have national rather than 
European preferences, democratic choice through national elections 
will ultimately have primacy over negotiated intergovernmental 
cooperation and coordination-failure is looming large.20 The simple 
conferral of budget policy to the EU-level without addressing the 
democracy issue is therefore problematic. The Maastricht Treaty has 
                                                 
19
 For a comparison of inequality in voting rights between Council and the 
European Parliament see Collignon, 2003. 
20
 The French Prime Minister J.P. Raffarin made the point in a television interview 
on 4 September 2003: "My prime task is not to make equations add up and do 
problems of arithmetic so that this or that office in this or that country is satisfied. 
My task is to make sure there are jobs for French men and women". And the leader 
of the government party UMP, A. Juppé seconded: « Nous sommes élus par des 
français, il vaut mieux que ce soit des Français qui soient contents de nous ». 
(www.democratie-socialisme.org/ article.php3?id_article=145) 
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left responsibility for fiscal policy at the national level, presumably 
because this form of subsidiarity represented greater democratic 
legitimacy. It has thereby also confined deliberation of what is best 
to a level where not the interest of all affected European citizens are 
taken into account, but only those of partial constituencies. On the 
other hand, the hard coordination rule in the SGP, if followed, makes 
budget choices consistent at the European level. Thus, there is a 
potential contradiction that must lead to the de-legitimisation of 
European policies.  
 
This model can be contrasted with the experience of the United 
States. In the 1980’s, under the Reagan/Volker policy mix, 
government deficits and interest rates were high, whereas under the 
Clinton-Greenspan policy mix in the 1990’s, deficits and interest 
rates were low. Whatever the historic causes and explanations, these 
two different policy mixes indicated varying democratic priorities 
for economic policies,21 which were fully debated during the 
Presidential campaign in 1992. Hence policy choices reflected voter 
input as democratic theory stipulates. In the EU, however, the policy 
preference for balanced budgets in the Stability and Growth Pact is 
written in stone and preference changes in some countries are 
superseded by the hard coordination rule. Yet, the choice of an 
efficient policy mix among a variety of consistent combinations of 
monetary and aggregate fiscal policy must be made at the EU-level. 
An optimal policy mix should maximise European citizens’ 
preferences, not those of governments.22 The democratic principle 
applied to the Community method of competence delegation to the 
EU-level would require a European constituency. 
 
                                                 
21
 See Collignon, 2003: chapter 6 for a fuller discussion. 
22
 This argument does not ignore the fact that the fiscal stance is usually the 
outcome of aggregating preferences for distributive fiscal measures on the income 
and expenditure side of the budget. But I believe that voters also judge the 
coherence of distributive measures proposed by competing parties. 
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The Constitutional Challenge. 
 
If the European Union wants to sustain and improve its legitimacy as 
a policy-maker and ultimately its power, it must function as a 
democratic society. Hence, it will need a mechanism to formulate 
policy preferences by European citizens at the European level. This 
is less a problem for inclusive collective goods, where strategic 
complementarities provide the incentive for endogenous preference 
convergence and where the Open Method of Coordination between 
governments will yield results. But when exclusive collective goods 
demand at least some degree of discretion of policy-making, not only 
is delegation to the EU-level necessary, but also the accountability of 
European policy makers to a singly European constituency, for 
otherwise neither collective judgement nor power will be equally 
distributed between citizens.  
 
For example, as an exclusive collective good, the definition of the 
aggregate fiscal policy stance is a collective European good in 
Euroland, as it may affect inflation, interest and exchange rates. It 
needs to be delegated to the European level, for only there can it be 
determined coherently as the complement for monetary policy. 
However the definition of the aggregate deficit lacks democratic 
legitimacy, unless it commands the consent of the majority of 
European citizens. Of course, the collectively preferred fiscal stance 
is largely the outcome of the policy debate on distributive outcomes; 
the majority of citizens may not even understand the definition of an 
aggregate stance (what is in, what is out etc.). However, consistency 
requires that all the distributive arguments are taken into account 
when formulating collective preferences. Yet, when collective 
deliberation, communication and judgement only takes place in 
national constituencies, the emerging consistency of preferences is 
national and not European. The binding force of the democratic 
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process for collective decision-making does then not extend to the 
provision of European public goods.  
 
The formation of collective preferences across Europe requires the 
democratic competition between rival elites for rival policy agendas 
and the involvement of ordinary citizens in European-wide policy 
deliberation (see also Hix, 2003). Clearly the control of the EU 
policy agenda by national governments with their bureaucratic 
infrastructure does not allow democratic competition. What is at 
issue here is the nature of political cleavages: Should European 
policy-making be dominated by national-cultural-communication 
cleavages or by cleavages of interest and political choice? By 
focusing on intergovernmental forms of governance, the dominant 
cleavage in Europe is national and this fact re-enforces the power 
and influence of dominant political forces in each member state at 
the expense of minorities. The EU’s governance reflects therefore a 
‘cumulative cleavage’. Alternatively, establishing democratic 
structures for collective choice at the European level will cross-cut 
traditional cultural cleavages and reduce their impact. This would 
not only support European integration by encouraging trans-border 
political alliances below government level, but it may actually be 
necessary for its survival: we know from other cases that cumulative 
cleavages may create a crisis of legitimacy that could lead to the 
collapse of the system (Dunleavy and O’Leary, 1987). 
 
The active involvement of citizens in EU-wide policy deliberation 
will happen if and only if they become voters that can censure a 
European government and this government will be accountable to its 
citizens. Today this is not the case in the European Union. European 
policies are largely defined through deliberation in the Council, but 
governments’ accountability is to national and not European 
constituencies. Political competition takes place within member 
states, not within Europe. As a consequence, national interests 
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dominate collective European interests; the universal is dominated 
by the particular. The ‘common concern’ is substituted by the 
concern of national governments to get re-elected and of national 
bureaucrats to keep their competences. Therefore what is needed is 
not just a gouvernement économique, but effectively a Government 
of Europe. This is not a statement of faith, but simply the conclusion 
from the logic of collective action. This logic gives us compelling 
reasons why exclusive collective goods are unlikely to be supplied 
optimally by large groups of countries on a voluntary basis. 
Conferral of decision-making to a higher, European authority is 
necessary to improve welfare. A European Government, naturally 
evolving from the European Commission, must reflect European-
wide policy preferences, but it would also contribute to their 
emergence through being elected by and accountable to European 
citizens23 or their representatives in the European Parliament. In 
practical terms this means that all economic policy competences for 
exclusive goods, such as stabilisation policy, must become a matter 
of co-decision with the European Parliament, rather than being 
monopolised by the Council.24 
 
It is often argued that fiscal policy-making should remain at the 
national level because national policy preferences are heterogeneous 
and centralisation creates preference frustration and other 
inefficiencies (see for example Alesina and Waczirac, 1999). 
However, this argument for subsidiarity is wrong. If a European 
government is liable to its citizens, the political process of electing 
such a government creates structures of policy competition. 
European-wide deliberation in the form of electoral contest will then 
reduce preference heterogeneity and policy dissent, because the 
competition for individual votes by parties and candidates requires 
                                                 
23
 For the role of the private sector and engaged citizens in European-wide policy 
preference formation, see Collignon and Schwarzer, 2003. 
24
 This applies in particular to the TEU articles 99, 100, 102, 103(§2), 104 (§ 6, 7, 
10, 14), 107 (§6), 111. 
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them to explain their policies and engage the electorate, but also 
because they need to build political alliances across borders to gain 
power. Before choosing, voters seek information. New information 
will change old preferences. Thus an integrated polity across Europe 
would emerge as a result of establishing a European government. By 
contrast, if policy choices are made by national governments, who 
are only accountable to national constituencies, policy preferences 
will naturally diverge and remain disjunct, given that national policy 
debates reflect essentially the national constituency. Therefore the 
degree of dissent, preference heterogeneity and policy frustration is 
structurally higher if policy-making remains in the exclusive domain 
of natural governments.25 
 
The implications for policy-making in general and for EMU- 
stabilisation policies in particular are important. The weakness of the 
Stability and Growth Pact is less its short-term inflexibility, i.e. the 
degree of binding obligation, but rather its lack of democratic 
legitimacy in the long term. Although hard budget constraints for 
fiscal authorities are a necessary condition for macroeconomic 
stability, such institutional rules are only sustainable if they are 
backed by collective acceptance. The purely procedural argument 
that the SGP has been ratified by democratic governments is not a 
sufficient guarantee for its success or long-term legitimacy. What is 
necessary is to define the macro-economic policy stance at the 
European level that coordinates implicitly the unified monetary 
policy with the aggregate fiscal policy stance and reflects the 
democratic policy preferences of all citizens. (For practical 
implications see Amato 2002, Collignon 2003). 
 
Conclusion 
 
                                                 
25
 I have given formal models for this argument in Collignon, 2001 and 2003. 
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Europe’s economic governance seems not only to be highly complex 
and of doubtful efficiency, but it is also unlikely to be sustainable in 
the long run. The Open Method of Coordination as created under the 
Lisbon Strategy is not the solution for the optimal provision of 
collective policy goods that is required to make Europe ‘one of the 
most competitive economies’ in the world. The reason is that this 
method is only able to achieve results in the domain of inclusive 
collective goods that create strategic complementarities and common 
synergies. But as a result of setting up EMU there is a large new 
class of collective goods, which cannot be efficiently provided by 
voluntary cooperation between national governments alone. They 
require not only policy coordination through hard rules to constrain 
deviating behaviour, but also full democratic legitimacy for their 
implementation.  Today’s policy regime, dominated by an increasing 
number of intergovernmental policy arrangements resembles the pre-
democratic Ancién Régime. Unless it deals with its democratic 
deficit, the EU runs the risk of being thrown into the dustbin of 
History by a revolution, which would have little to do with the noble 
principles that inspired Jean Monnet and European integration ever 
since. The solution is endowing the European Union with a truly 
democratic constitution, putting European citizens at the centre 
rather than governmental bureaucrats. Anything else risks the 
disintegration of Europe, given the increasing difficulties of 
voluntary policy coordination in an enlarged European Union. The 
conflicts around the Common Foreign and Security Policy regarding 
the war on Iraq are early warning signs of difficult times ahead. 
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